I'm honoured to help. I think I can be properly impartial, because I don't agree with either of you; I don't believe in free will at all. We can do what we want, but we can't choose what to want.
Just a quick note before I begin - isn't "Christian theist" partly tautological? Is it possible to be a Christian and either a deist or an atheist? How would a person of either combination reconcile the supposed miracles of Christ?
Plus, a quick glossary for those not used to this kind of discussion: omni-max means omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent and omni-benevolent all at once, as Christians claim God is. P1, P2, etc. are premises from which conclusion C is derived. If the combined P doesn't lead to the C, it's a bad argument.
You can do better than an unknown hypothetical OM/FW harmoniser. There are known hypotheticals out there. For free will to exist, let's go large and say it must be possible for any human to make any choice at any time, even if that choice may not agree with a god. One solution which also allows an omni-max god is that all choices agree with that god; the nature of benevolence is that all human choices, regardless of the suffering they may cause, are ultimately beneficial. The god has used its infinite mind and intuition to predict all possible futures, and has found (or declared) all of them to be good. This is a potential solution to the Problem of Evil as well.
Therefore I don't think there's a deductive path to a contradiction between an omni-max god and free will, so if you're going to argue it anyway evidential and probabilistic arguments are the way to go.
To add my own spin, the fact that there are answers to the tough questions like supposed free will and the Problem of Evil does not help Christianity as much as you'd think. The problem is that there are too many answers coming from the one religion. The PoE is the better-known example. Answers to that can involve exempt demons, free will, "mysterious ways" and the nature of evil itself. It would sound better if Christians settled on one answer, because the current multitude demonstrates that nobody actually knows.
- SmartLX
Comments
Thanks for the quick reply,
Thanks for the quick reply, and I'm sorry my question posted in one sloppy blob. For some reason, my paragraphs collapsed after I submitted.
I used "Christian theist" as a self-identifier to distinguish between other types of theists, for instance Hindus or muslims. I suppose it's possible that a Christian could be a deist or atheist--the terms have been bandied about before--but of course an orthodox Christian would deny their claim.
Incidentally, I am no fanatic for the autonomous free will concept either. I like the sound of your will formula at first glance, and properly qualified, I might agree to it. The free will model just happened to be the model we were working with.
It's refreshing that an atheist would acknowledge solutions to the PoE in public. That speaks highly of you, so I'll return the favor: perhaps it would be better if we settled on one answer for the PoE; however, I doubt that would demonstrate that anyone actually knows for sure.
I really appreciate the time and effort. Great concept here, and well executed. Thanks....
NP.
Glad to be of service, Schooner.
Don't worry about the formatting, it simply doesn't work in the question field for the moment. All the more reason to be succinct, at least until you're writing comments.
I still like the PoE, even though there are possible solutions. It makes everybody think as hard as they can.
Huh?
"I think I can be properly impartial, because I don't agree with either of you; I don't believe in free will at all. We can do what we want, but we can't choose what to want."
Um, the question isn't whether free will exists, but rather whether free will can exist with an omni-max god.
"You can do better than an unknown hypothetical OM/FW harmoniser. There are known hypotheticals out there."
Name one that works.
"For free will to exist, let's go large and say it must be possible for any human to make any choice at any time, even if that choice may not agree with a god. One solution which also allows an omni-max god is that all choices agree with that god; the nature of benevolence is that all human choices, regardless of the suffering they may cause, are ultimately beneficial."
But, that's the whole point isn't it? Your "choices" are necessarily already selected and your desires aren't actually yours in the case of an omni-max deity, as you pointed out above. With an omni-max deity, one can not choose what to want because those choices were already set in stone in a determined path. Hence, the selection space has already been winnowed down to 1 possibility before you ever got a chance to "choose" and therefore you don't actually have a choice in the matter. You may think you do, which I call "apparent free will" but you don't. Such is the necessary consequence of an omni-max deity.
"Therefore I don't think there's a deductive path to a contradiction between an omni-max god and free will, so if you're going to argue it anyway evidential and probabilistic arguments are the way to go."
Except that you answered a different question. You answered whether god would have forethought and decided that our pre-determined path was good or not, not whether we actually have free will.
I presume you represent the
I presume on the off chance that you represent the other half of the initial discussion, Anonymous.
Yes, I misunderstood the nature of the argument at first; I thought free will was a premise not just for the argument, but for the participants. Turns out it was just a hypothetical.
However I was indeed looking for a way free will could exist in the presence of an omni-max god. I thought of a possible "OM/FW harmoniser": the all-choices-are-good scenario you quoted.
The reason it works is that just because an omni-max god can control everything doesn't mean it does control everything. If all possible outcomes are to the god's liking, it doesn't have to. Our hypothetical, easy-to-please OM god can set up a world where some choices are truly possible but incapable of affecting important objectives. That way its will gets done no matter what. Perhaps the choices made are therefore ultimately meaningless, and whether they're beneficial to ordinary people is irrelevant, but they're still real choices. We get to choose at least the specifics of our own destiny.
Again, I don't think for a moment that this is anything like the real state of affairs, not believing in either gods or free will. I just think the two can be reconciled if the nature of the god is a certain way. Reconciling this with the expected nature of any particular god is another matter.
Ah, but what then?
Yes, I'm the other person in the discussion.
If there are "all-possible outcomes" as you describe, then god is not omni-max. Implicit in the omni-max scenario is the end result of this universe being determined. If the universe is not determined, and I can make a choice between A or B, then how does god know what I choose before I choose it? The only way for god to have 100% predictive capacity is for my "choice" to have already been made, hence the system must be deterministic. In that sense, how can we possibly choose between A or B? In essence, we really can only choose A, as that is what was determined for us when the universe was conceived by this omni-max entity.
The original scenario put forth for this example was the scenario where god writes a book about someone's future life (down to the detail of all thoughts, actions, feelings, etc.) and hands it to that person. Would the person be able to read the book and do something that is not written in the book? Perhaps that person dies in an unfortunate way that is easily avoidable, like getting hit by a car. Will the person be able to choose to stay in bed that day and not get hit by the car? If so, then god would have been shown to be wrong, as the book would be inaccurate, and god would be shown to not be omni-max. If the person can't choose not to avoid the car, then it shows that we don't have free will, as no one who is not suicidal would choose to walk in front of a car fully knowing it would kill them (minus situations where doing so would save the life of another, etc.)
I'm really ignorant here,
I'm really ignorant here, but I have had others bring this up in conversation (on a much less educated scale).
My thought has always been that even if a God knows the choices everyone is going to make, if he is not controlling them it's still free will. He is just privy to the info ahead of time.
Determinism
Knowing how the universe would operate from before its inception set the universe on a determined course. IOW, nothing can deviate from how god has already foreseen it would occur. By setting the universe in motion such that you would "choose" option A, then B, then A, then A again, etc. god did determine for you what you would do. Hence, you can not have free will.
You know, Anonymous, I think
You know, Anonymous, I think you've got me. If a god allows any choice in the universe, it cannot know exactly what will happen, even though it knows every detail of each option. In my scenario it simply doesn't care what happens in certain insignificant situations, but that's essentially choosing not to know certain things. I was only considering omnipotence and not omniscience.
I still see two potential ways to reconcile omni-max and free will. One is to define omniscience as complete knowledge of the present, not the future, owing to the unpredictability of quantum indeterminacy or what have you. That of course is completely incompatible with the concept of a divine, unstoppable plan.
The other is some other, unknown "OM/FW harmoniser", but it's useless to the discussion without a working hypothesis of what it is and/or how it works. To say, "Omni-max and free will can co-exist in the presence of an OM/FW harmoniser," is to say, "Omni-max and free will can co-exist in the presence of an object, entity or state of affairs whose presence allows omni-max and free will to co-exist." It either defines the harmoniser, or states the bleeding obvious.
The important issue is whether a harmoniser could exist. Until the potential of a harmoniser is at least demonstrated in theory (because at the moment we have an apparently sound logical argument that it's impossible), there's no reason to believe that. I tried, and it looks like my harmoniser concept doesn't really work. Got another one, Schooner? Or a way to fix mine?
"Got another one, Schooner?
"Got another one, Schooner? Or a way to fix mine?"
Sure, no problem, but first let me thank you again for your willingness to be put in the middle. I'm certain my anonymous friend agrees.
There do in fact exist theological systems to reconcile omnimax and free will. However, that's not the question we are striving to resolve. When I titled the original post “A question of Logic,” perhaps I was ambiguous. I actually meant a question of logic, or better put, a question of how logic functions. This distinction was further blurred by the blob that the OP became when posted. To restate, then, the question is not whether omnimax and free will are incompatible, but whether a deductive argument can be successfully executed that demonstrates the incompatibility, whereby all rational agents would be compelled to acknowledge its truth.
I think it's clear that a deductive argument cannot be produced that achieves this aim. When you state that "Until the potential of a harmonizer is at least demonstrated in theory (because at the moment we have an apparently sound logical argument that it's impossible), there's no reason to believe that" you have forgotten where the burden of proof lies. It lies unmistakably with the one contending for the deductive argument, for it is her premise that requires defending.
Thus, the deductive arguer is stuck with a premise that cannot be defended, because it is impossible to refute the possibility that a harmonizer exists in the supernatural realm, and because God purportedly exists supernaturally, the knowledge that no harmonizer exists in that realm is required to defend the premise.
Indeed, this is the very reason that the deductive form of the problem of evil has been abandoned: the statement "God cannot have a morally acceptable reason to permit evil" is unprovable, hence, defeating to the deductive form of the argument. With our current argument regarding OM/FW, the statements "God cannot have an OM/FW harmonizer" or “there exists no harmonizer in the supernatural realm” function in like manner, and prevent the deductive form of the argument from being successfully executed.
With that said, I would predict that you would agree with my anonymous friend's argumentation, and it seems that you have. But you are agreeing to the inductive form of the argument, also referred to as evidential or probabilistic. This is illustrated by your insistence that the theist should demonstrate the existence of the harmonizer. Utilizing the inductive form of the argument, you have recognized all the good reasons why it appears that OM & FW cannot exist together. It is then incumbent upon the theist to demonstrate the harmonizer, or some other system that achieves the compatibility of the two concepts.
My rejoinder
I too would like to thank you for your time and consideration.
"Thus, the deductive arguer is stuck with a premise that cannot be defended, because it is impossible to refute the possibility that a harmonizer exists in the supernatural realm, and because God purportedly exists supernaturally, the knowledge that no harmonizer exists in that realm is required to defend the premise."
My reply to this is that we don't live in the supernatural realm, but this realm where the nature of free will and omni-max deities do preclude each other. It might be true that they don't in another realm where different rules apply, but not in this one where we have rules of logic, etc. To posit that they might not preclude each other in some unknown supernatural realm does not hold in this realm where we know the rules, etc. If we accept this type of reasoning, then we must abandon all hope to say anything about anything, as it can always be argued that the opposite can theoretically be true in the supernatural realm.
"My reply to this is that we
"My reply to this is that we don't live in the supernatural realm, but this realm where the nature of free will and omni-max deities do preclude each other."
There's a few problems with your response, my anonymous friend. First, you've committed principii by assuming that OM & FW preclude each other in this realm. After all, that's what you're attempting to prove.
Secondly, an omnimax God that exists supernaturally is also by virtue of those qualities assumed to interact with the natural realm. We would normally think it inconsistent for dead men to return to life as well, but the existence of a supernatural OM God changes the equation. Thus, it's necessary to consider any supernatural harmonizers that are theoretically capable of interacting with the natural realm, and OM presupposes this theoretic capability.
Thirdly, even if I granted your objection, you still have only addressed the "there exists a supernatural harmonizer" objection, not the "God possesses a supernatural harmonizer for OM/FW" objection. As stated above, OM presupposes that God is capable of interacting with his creation.
Lastly, even if I granted that you had solved these difficulties, and I think it's readily apparent that you cannot, I could remove the supernatural component of the objection and revert to a full-fledged appeal to nescience and claim that there are properties of this universe you are yet unaware of that harmonize OM & FW. This type of occurrence is not unknown in the constant advance of science. The wave/particle duality if light comes to mind, as does the subatomic realm.
"If we accept this type of reasoning, then we must abandon all hope to say anything about anything, as it can always be argued that the opposite can theoretically be true in the supernatural realm."
Incorrect. The supernatural is contained within your premises, therefore, it must be considered. It would be a logical farce to reason about supernatural beings without considering the supernatural realm. And why do you think atheists press this pressure point so fiercely when the burden of proof is reversed?
Nevertheless, to expose the slippery slope element of your statement, there's no reason to necessarily invoke the supernatural for arguments relating to natural factors. But make no mistake, what we do abandon based on your statement are deductive arguments in favor of inductive ones when handling subjects such as OM/FW. To that extent, your last statement is correct.
Answer
"There's a few problems with your response, my anonymous friend. First, you've committed principii by assuming that OM & FW preclude each other in this realm. After all, that's what you're attempting to prove."
Nope, not at all. I was simply pointing out that if we are reduced to positing supernatural fixes that may or may not exist in a supernatural realm that may or may not exist, then we've exhausted the possibility of it working here.
"Secondly, an omnimax God that exists supernaturally is also by virtue of those qualities assumed to interact with the natural realm."
And therefore subject to the laws that govern this natural realm in terms of interaction. Unless you wish to posit that god is continually supernaturally creating miracles that somehow allow us to have free will which doesn't violate his omni-max-ness, which is absurd, I think we can safely assume that the laws of logic hold up here (i.e. that something can not be A and not A at the same time, etc.)
"Thirdly, even if I granted your objection, you still have only addressed the "there exists a supernatural harmonizer" objection, not the "God possesses a supernatural harmonizer for OM/FW" objection."
If it doesn't exist, how can god possess it?
"...I could remove the supernatural component of the objection and revert to a full-fledged appeal to nescience and claim that there are properties of this universe you are yet unaware of that harmonize OM & FW."
You could claim that there *might be* components, not that there are. Either way, will these components allow something to be A and not A at the same time? Will they destroy our logic? Science has yet to do that.
"Incorrect. The supernatural is contained within your premises, therefore, it must be considered."
Sorry, but according to your reasoning, we can never make any deductive arguments, because there can always be a supernatural or god of the gaps defeater.
I was thinking about this last night, and I came to the conclusion that this problem is significantly different from the problem of evil in some critical regards. I will admit that I'm not sold on whether the problem of evil can be stated deductively or not, but in the POE we are dealing with intentionalities and unknowns based on accounts of good/evil/god's will, etc. In this case, we are not dealing with such things. We are dealing with supposed attributes that carry very definite logical baggage. I haven't fleshed it out too much, but it was just a thought I had that I thought I would share.
"Nope, not at all. I was
"Nope, not at all. I was simply pointing out that if we are reduced to positing supernatural fixes that may or may not exist in a supernatural realm that may or may not exist, then we've exhausted the possibility of it working here."
Let’s look at your statement again:
“My reply to this is that we don't live in the supernatural realm, but this realm where the nature of free will and omni-max deities do preclude each other."
Positing that this is a realm where the nature of free will and omni-max deities do preclude each other is begging the question. But let’s get this out, once again. It’s your premise that posits the supernatural. I’m only noting that you cannot defend the supernatural aspects of your premise. You can claim that a supernatural deity cannot effect change, or interact outside the laws of this natural realm, but how would you then defend that? You’re the one logically caught by your own “supernatural fix.” Burden of proof, my friend.
“And therefore subject to the laws that govern this natural realm in terms of interaction.”
See above. How could you possibly produce a deductive argument whereby all rational agents would be forced to acknowledge the truth of this proposition? OM by definition generally denies this assertion. But more interestingly, have you forgotten your atheism? How many times have I seen you respond in print that there is no compelling evidence for this, therefore you are justified in your unbelief? 100?
“Unless you wish to posit that god is continually supernaturally creating miracles that somehow allow us to have free will which doesn't violate his omni-max-ness”
I don’t, but thanks for making my point for me, before begging the question again: “which is absurd”
“I think we can safely assume that the laws of logic hold up here”
The laws of logic dictate that when you cannot wholly defend a premise, even due to unknowns, then a deductive argument is not rationally compelling to all rational agents. It’s the distinction between soundness and validity. I’m trying to follow the dictates of logic, but I don’t have an accomplice here :)
“If it doesn't exist, how can god possess it?”
I agree that was sloppy on my part. Good catch. I think you can see the distinction, though.
“You could claim that there *might be* components, not that there are”
That’s the point.
“Either way, will these components allow something to be A and not A at the same time?”
More question begging.
“Will they destroy our logic? Science has yet to do that.”
As Quantum mechanics is explained to me, science has. Likewise with wave/particle duality. I don’t push science very far, though, being a layman.
“Sorry, but according to your reasoning, we can never make any deductive arguments, because there can always be a supernatural or god of the gaps defeater.”
I refuted this in the last post. This is simply a reassertion of the refuted point with no rationale.
“I haven't fleshed it out too much, but it was just a thought I had that I thought I would share.”
Thanks for being open. If nothing else is achieved here, and by the looks of it we’re deadlocked as usual, I’m just glad we’ve finally gotten to a point where you trust me enough to share without being afraid I would take advantage of you.
I’m satisfied with my case here, with the reminder that I do have positive rationale to support the compatibility of OM/FW as well. I’ll give you a response, and field any direct questions that you might have (mark them distinctly), and then leave it up to the Rational Response Squad jury, if they wish to weigh in, or ask further questions. At any rate, it was an enjoyable exercise.
Awaiting SmartLX's return
You've said your piece, I've said mine. SmartLX, do you have a verdict?
Let me simply add a couple small points:
1. Schooner, it seems like you wish to state that I'm begging the question because you don't feel the argument is proven. The problem with this is, however, that the argument is proven. Your response seems to be along the lines that you simply don't accept it, so you are positing that it must not hold true because there might be some flaw in it. Without being able to point out that flaw, however, it's a tough row to hoe.
2. You didn't refute my analysis of your argument, you simply disagreed. I stand by my analysis. I see no reason why your argument can't be applied to any deductive argument, since we can always posit that the unknown might overturn the argument.
Question for you (only one): Can something be both A and not A at the same time?
"Can something be both A and
"Can something be both A and not A at the same time?"
Despite what the physicists report, I will follow the law of non-contradiction where it leads when engaged analytically as we are; however, you need to incorporate relationship: A thing cannot be A and non-A at the same time and in the same relationship.
I can be a father(A) and a son(Non-A) at the same time, but not at the same time and in the same relationship.
You already know this though, since I utilized it to demonstrate that there was no inherent contradiction between OM & FW. What's up?
Clarification
Actually, the father son thing doesn't work. In order to work, you would have to say that:
A = Father
not A = not Father.
If A = Father, son is not the same as not A in this instance. I think you get the gist, however.
The point is that you are not using this fact, you are rebelling against it. The example and arguments given point to a scenario where god being omni-max and our free will can not exist together. The supposed supernatural defeater is an argument, basically, that states that things that are contradictory don't have to be in the supernatural realm - that something can be both A and not A at the same time. But, if this sort of logical relationship holds in this universe, then we can say that OM and FW can not be harmonized based on the laws of this universe, even if they can in some supposed parallel or supernatural universe.
Obviously, the concept of
Obviously, the concept of son belongs in the category of “not father.” You’re still misstating the law of non-contradiction though, and will continue to do so until you incorporate relationship in addition to time.
“The point is that you are not using this fact, you are rebelling against it.”
I disagree. In order for OM/FW to be contradictory pursuant to the law of non-contradiction, it is necessary to define OM as “a thing that precludes FW”. Thus, it would be contradictory to claim that FW exists with OM at the same time and in the same relationship, or OM & not OM at the same time and in the same relationship. That’s what you are trying to prove, however. It’s not the definition of OM. Please note that by defining OM as “a thing which precludes FW,” you are once again begging the question.
“The example and arguments given point to a scenario where god being omni-max and our free will can not exist together.”
Precisely. They “point” to it. They don’t demonstrate it conclusively, whereby every rational agent would be forced to accept its truth. Nevertheless, I’ll offer you the following logical olive branch with the hope that we can put this argument to rest.
Our current argument revolves around the issue of whether or not a successful deductive argument can be produced whereby all rational agents would be forced to accept its truth. I’ve argued that one cannot be produced (it would help if you would state a formal argument), but I’ll agree to this much: You can produce a deductive argument regarding OM/FW where the premises guarantee the conclusion if they are true, and in your opinion, the premises are more likely than their negations.
This is identical to claiming that anyone who accepts your premises as true will be forced to agree with your conclusion by the force of logic. Moreover, if they even agree that the premises are more likely than their negations, they will be irrational in denying the conclusion, given the truth of the premises. I don’t accept the truth of the premises, so it wouldn’t be binding for me, but you would at least have an argument for your own purposes.
The point I’m arguing is this, however. I could just as easily say the following:
Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
The universe began to exist.
Therefore, the universe has a cause.
It’s a valid deductive argument. It has current science to argue in its behalf. Yet, you are going to challenge it, and especially my subsequent inferences to the actual cause, in many ways, with the appeal to nescience being a component of that challenge, just as I am doing in our argument. Let me quote Wes Morriston’s conclusion after countering William Lane Craig’s Kalam argument (from a 2002 article by Dr. Morriston you should be able to find on his webpage. He’s a good thinker, BTW):
“My own view is that we simply don’t know enough to draw firm conclusions about such matters. It’s fun to speculate, but we cannot hope to come up with answers that any honest, reasonable, and well-informed person would be bound to accept. Most of us have different and somewhat conflicting intuitions about time and eternity, causation and agency, about the nature of personhood, and about many other matters. It is an illusion to suppose that there is a single obviously correct way of sorting it all out. That is why the history of philosophy is, and will continue to be, a history of contest and controversy … and fun.”
Sounds eerily similar to our argument. Mr. Morriston has specific reservations about the Kalam argument, and offers them in conjunction with his ultimate appeal to nescience, in the same manner that I have specific positive reservations that represent philosophically live alternatives held by some of the greatest skeptical thinkers, Hume for example, of history (compatibilism/Molinism) with your argument in conjunction with my appeal to nescience. I understand your drive as an atheist to disprove OM conceptions of God, and I would encourage you to keep trying. There are many who have entered the faith through such attempts. And even if you remain an atheist, I remind you of the atheist mantra of free thought…you’d better be sure you’re right before you wall off a particular recess of your mind and proceed to label others as fools who disagree with you.
In this particular argument, I think it’s readily apparent, as argued, that this is ultimately a truth that we will have to decide for ourselves, based on all factors present. That’s why I encourage you to formulate your argument evidentially, rather than deductively. The argument’s much more persuasive when delivered in that fashion, because in the final analysis—unless you can present a formal structure of the argument I’m not aware of—the argument is unpersuasive deductively for obvious reasons, and when you tell me I must believe it to be rational, the claim falls flat. Perhaps this is the olive branch then: state your argument deductively if you wish, but preface it by saying “If you agree with my premises, you must agree with my conclusion” rather than “OM/FW are obviously contradictory, and if you don’t agree with me you’re a fool.”
“The supposed supernatural defeater is an argument, basically, that states that things that are contradictory don't have to be in the supernatural realm - that something can be both A and not A at the same time.”
You can reproduce this same claim 80,000 times if you wish, but it will never cease to be begging the question. Furthermore, it’s not my claim. My claim is that the presence of the supernatural, a concept obviously necessary to a supernatural God, or at least necessary to this argument, might harmonize OM/FW. This does not imply that the supernatural causes contradictory concepts to magically transform into non-contradictory concepts. It implies that there may be more factors than that which you are cognizant of, reasoning from this natural realm only. If there are more factors in play, logic demands/requires/necessitates that you consider them. I’m not claiming the supernatural changes the rules of logic; rather, I’m claiming the rules of logic require you to consider the supernatural.
Again, this is exactly the line, and rightly so, I have witnessed you pursue as an atheist in blog discussion after blog discussion. For example, doesn’t my argument mirror the atheist response to Pascal’s wager? Here’s an example taken right off this blog: “In short, Pascal's Wager uses an incomplete and incorrect premise.” Smart LX is arguing that there are thing we are not sure of with the supernatural realm, therefore, the premise is weakened to a point that he is rational in doubting it. His defense is that there may be 20,000 different gods possible in the supernatural realm; thus, proof positive for the God of Pascal is required to execute the wager. We’ve agreed on the OM God in our particular argument, but we are not certain of the supernatural realm and its relation to OM/FW. The objections are similar: a lack of knowledge produces a weak premise.
Your constant reply to this appears to be that OM/FW are contradictory in all realms, or that since we know they are contradictory here, they must be contradictory in all possible worlds. Despite your constant claims to they contrary, I accept that what is contradictory here must be contradictory in all possible worlds. Problem is, you cannot prove they are contradictory in this universe without a full knowledge of the supernatural realm. The supernatural realm, if it exists, is always assumed within the context of an OM god to supervene the natural realm. The classic doctrines of the OM God’s creation, governance, and preservation of this universe presuppose that supernatural factors must be considered in logical arguments of this type. After all, if it is true that an OM God preserves matter supernaturally at every moment of matter’s existence, it’s clear that supernatural forces are at work in this universe, and if they are at work in this universe, it follows that you need to factor them into your logical structures.
This does not result in the logical slippery slop you suggest. We consistently apply a sort of methodological naturalism when reasoning about the natural world. The difference here is that we are not considering the natural world only. We are discussing the supernatural, and to apply methodological naturalism to this argument is ludicrous by definition.
“But, if this sort of logical relationship holds in this universe,”
Are you prepared to renounce the deliverances of science that contradict this claim? I’ve alluded to a couple of examples without comment from your end. The physicists report that the law of non-contradiction does not hold in the subatomic realm. The subatomic realm is part of this universe. So which is it? Is science wrong, or are there instances in this universe where “this sort of logical relationship” does not hold up?
OK, so I destroyed the “let’s wrap it up” thing. Sorry, but I’ve noticed you have that effect on folks, my anonymous friend. No offense intended :)
Wrap it up
I'm unaware of any physicists that claim the law of non-contradiction does not hold in the sub-atomic realm. Perhaps you are referring to a Schroedinger's cat sort of thing (QM) where we don't know the status of something until we observe it, which causes the waveform to collapse? This is not the same.
Son is not the same as (not A) in this case. It would be B. If something is A, it is not precluded from also being B.
Lastly, using your supernatural "defeater" I could say that something could violate the laws of logic in the supernatural realm, so no deductive arguments are possible. I know you don't get why I keep making this claim, but I don't see any way around it. Name a deductive argument and I will reply that it could be defeated in the supernatural realm - you don't know that it can't be true or false there - so you can't make the deductive argument.
Also, I'm not assuming my conclusions. I've shown how the defintion of OM leads to a situation where FW can not exist. It's true that the official definition does not say this, but it is the logical conclusion of what OM is. I believe that you are forced to logically conclude that which I have shown, and the fact that you aren't is mostly due to an inability (due to many factors) to understand the scope of the terms of the attributes of OM-ness (no offense). It's hard to conceptualize what perfect is. It's hard to conceptualize what OM is. It's also hard to conceptualize what it would be like for us to not have FW, especially since it feels like we do.
So, hopefully, SmartLX will re-appear and stop us from going back and forth anymore. I'll stop, as I have a feeling that SmartLX will see why the universe/cause argument and the Pascal's Wager argument don't fit the bill here.
Wrap coming
Hi fellas. I thought it best to let you two go at it for a while, but I think you're both a bit over it now. I'll wrap up when I have enough time to digest everything you've written, which will be soon.
Verdict, sort of
- Schooner has said several times that theology can reconcile omni-max and free will. Would someone please explain how, so that we might actually declare some of this stuff moot?
- Arguing for a OM/FW harmoniser only from the possibility of a supernatural OM/FW harmoniser is an admission that there is no available concept of a natural, conventionally logical harmoniser, and belief in any harmoniser from this implicit premise is tantamount to fideism. In that case, there's no point arguing anymore.
- My response to Pascal's Wager is only aiming for rational doubt, rather than being weakened to it. The point of the Wager is to create certainty that one course of action is best.
- I've just realised something about the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Human beings have never, ever witnessed anything beginning to exist except in a semantic sense. (For example, when water freezes we call it "ice" and think of it as new.) That's why we came up with the law of conservation in the first place: to reflect our observations that nothing is ever created or destroyed. Therefore the one point where we might even hypothesise that anything began to exist was at the beginning (if any) of the universe. Applying to the same universe the generalisation that is the first premise to is therefore begging the question.
- Someone, as an exercise, demonstrate Anon's point about any argument being defeatable in the supernatural realm. Take an argument FOR the existence of God, say the cosmological argument, ignore the common counter-arguments and use the supernatural (or, conversely, the natural but unknown) to counter it.
I don't think I've settled anything, but for any subsequent discussion which starts further along the train of thought because of what we've written here, we've saved the human race time and effort. Again, sorry for the delay.
Some pretty worthwhile stuff
Some pretty worthwhile stuff in response. Thanks.
"- Schooner has said several times that theology can reconcile omni-max and free will. Would someone please explain how, so that we might actually declare some of this stuff moot?"
I breifly mentioned compatibilism and Molinism above. Both are active, vibrant philosophical/theological systems with plenty of support, both historically and currently. In the case of compatibilism, it even has the support of well-known skeptics.
The point, then, is not necessarily whether they are true (it would seem rather presumptuous for someone to think they could declare compatibilism moot), though that is certainly a valid pursuit, but that they are vibrant philosophies that solve the OM/FW paradox. Compatibilism itself declares OM and FW compatible by definition. Hence, to declare OM/FW contradictory, the advocate of that argument would be required to defeat compatibilism, something that has never been achieved.
Moreover, in my opinion, compatibilism provides the best description of human will available. By any standard, then, why would I ever agree that a deductive argument exists establishing the contradictory nature of OM/FW, and why would anyone claim I am not rational in doing so?
"In that case, there's no point arguing anymore."
Pretty close to my contention, Smart.
"My response to Pascal's Wager is only aiming for rational doubt, rather than being weakened to it."
Precisely, by way of appealing in part to unknowns in the supernatural realm.
"Applying to the same universe the generalisation that is the first premise to is therefore begging the question."
This is incorrect. The Kalam argument attempts to demonstrate that the (this) universe began to exist, independently of the first premiss, and would therefore be subject to the first premiss, if true. The first premiss, "whatever begins to exist has a cause or reason of its existence" is a metaphysical contention that stands or falls on its own.
But what you've hinted at has merit, IMO, because you are indicating that's it's very difficult to be certaain of "before the universe" or "in metaphysical time" etc., which is very close to what Dr. Morriston argued above, and much like I am arguing here, which in itself is a standard atheist theme, and one that should be acknowledged by all in light of Kant and Hume.
"Again, sorry for the delay."
No worries. We appreciate rational folk wherever they may be found. You didn't ask for this headache, (well, perhaps you did with a site called ask the atheist) but have been more than gracious to entertain us.
Kalam
Thanks for the response Schooner. Good point about metaphysical time. My point was a suspicion that Kalam's first premise may not have any other basis than the second, but that's a discussion unto itself.
Further down the rabbit hole
"The point, then, is not necessarily whether they are true (it would seem rather presumptuous for someone to think they could declare compatibilism moot), though that is certainly a valid pursuit, but that they are vibrant philosophies that solve the OM/FW paradox. Compatibilism itself declares OM and FW compatible by definition."
Well, this is convenient, isn't it? Whenever some logical contradiction pops up that I and others don't want to be true, I'll simply declare there is no problem by definition. Sorry to sound snarky, but this isn't a solution at all. Compatibilism doesn't necessarily deal with OM/FW, and the closest it has come to trying has been the classical Compatibilists who have come up short. Modern Compatibilists deal more with moral responsibility.
The fact remains that what is entailed by the definitions of what OM and FW are incompatible as has been shown. And, SmartLX is correct to point out that until and unless someone can actually come up with a defeater, that we should treat the argument as such. Otherwise, once again we are forced to never accept any argument. And why not? Because, I can always claim that there is some answer to the problem that we simply haven't found yet. This is not how rational debate works, however.
"Moreover, in my opinion, compatibilism provides the best description of human will available. By any standard, then, why would I ever agree that a deductive argument exists establishing the contradictory nature of OM/FW, and why would anyone claim I am not rational in doing so?"
Because you are misunderstanding the scope of the Compatibilists' argument, and holding onto what you want to be so even though it has been demonstrated to not be so. You keep claiming that Compatibilism answers the problem, but you can't seem to ever point to a Compatibilist argument that actually does this. That would be like if I argued that Creationism defeats evolution. You might ask me what evidence Creationism has that overturns evolution and I would reply that it's defined that way and I think it provides the best description of how we got here, so why would I ever accept evolution? I might also add, "It just does," for good measure.
"Pretty close to my contention, Smart."
I don't want to speak for SmartLX, but I think he's agreeing with me that without some argument or harmonizer, he's not seeing why we should declare that OM/FW are compatible. Please correct me if I'm wrong SmartLX.
I'm not going to wade into the Kalam stuff.
“Sorry to sound snarky,
“Sorry to sound snarky, but this isn't a solution at all. Compatibilism doesn't necessarily deal with OM/FW”
Actually, the snark is welcome, because you’ve demonstrated conclusively that you’re incorrect. Anyone vaguely acquainted with compatibilism already knows you’re wrong, and for those not familiar with the system, a simple internet search will reveal literally thousands of posts that are monotonous in their agreement of what compatibilism is, and what it claims. Here’s two quick ones:
Wiki
Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent (people who hold this belief are known as compatibilists)
Compatibilism, as championed by the ancient Greek Stoics, Hobbes, Hume and many contemporary philosophers, is a theory that argues that free will and determinism exist and are in fact compatible.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem. This philosophical problem concerns a disputed incompatibility between free will and determinism. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed in terms of a compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.
Not the same
I should note that determinism != omni-max determinism.
Compatibilism does deal with determinism, but not necessarily the sort of determinism that is logically necessitated by an omni-max deity. I'm surprised that you would make the remarks you made, considering that we've already discussed this in the other forum. Modern Compatibilists seem (from my reading) to focus on a more limited sense of determinism than that which comes from an omni-max being. The closest that anyone has come is the classical Compatibilists, but they've been pretty soundly defeated - as noted by the very same Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that you are citing now in your favor.
There is no solution to the deterministic world that is necessitated by a god that is omni-max, which is what I've been pointing out from the beginning. Defining away the problem doesn't do the trick, nor does appealing to maybe's and possible gaps in our knowledge. At this point, I don't see what you really have to stand on. If god exists and is omni-max, then that entails that all aspects of everything are determined to the most minute detail, which does indeed preclude free will.
"but not necessarily the
"but not necessarily the sort of determinism that is logically necessitated by an omni-max deity. I'm surprised that you would make the remarks you made, considering that we've already discussed this in the other forum"
I don't recall you ever claiming there was a different brand of determinism based on an OM God, but I'll give you the benefit of the doubt. You'll need to state then exactly what OM determinism is, how it differs from determinism, and the evidence you have to claim that's the type of God Christians propose.
"The closest that anyone has come is the classical Compatibilists, but they've been pretty soundly defeated - as noted by the very same Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy that you are citing now in your favor."
The following from Stanford represents soundly defeated in your view?
"Another important feature of the compatibilist view Mele offers is that, like Fischer and Ravizza's, it also eschews the demand for regulative control. In fact, Mele, along with David Robb, coauthored one of the most compelling defenses of Frankfurt examples in order to demonstrate that moral responsibility, and also free will and autonomous agency, do not require the freedom to do otherwise (Mele and Robb, 1998). Hence Mele, like Frankfurt, Fischer, and Wallace, avoids difficulties arising from incompatibilist attacks upon regulative control, such as the one posed by the Consequence Argument (see section 4.1).
A good deal more could be said in an effort to explain the sort of compatibilism Mele suggests, but one of the more provocative and distinctive element in his account is his strategic return to the austerity of the classical compatibilists. The Action Theory Theory gets a lot of mileage just out of action theory. It is an elegant philosophical maneuver and merits more serious attention than it has received up to this point."
"There is no solution to the deterministic world that is necessitated by a god that is omni-max,"
I've provided two, Compatibilism and Molinism, that every known philospher and theologian in the annals of mankind will acknowledge as potential solutions, even if they disagree with them. The existence of these well-known solutions, with broad-based support over centuries makes it rational for me to be skeptical of your argument. Any other conclusion is irrational, unless I missed the part where you demonstrated Compatibilism and Molinism to be false, to the amazement of every other thinker in the history of the world who has failed to do so.
"You'll need to state then
"You'll need to state then exactly what OM determinism is, how it differs from determinism, and the evidence you have to claim that's the type of God Christians propose."
Certainly there can be loose determinism, such as fate, and more stringent definitions of determinism, correct? The determinism at stake here is the logical conclusion of the assertion of an omni-max god, which is what Xians propose god to be.
"The following from Stanford represents soundly defeated in your view?"
I was more thinking of this passage:
"The classical compatibilist attempt to answer the incompatibilist objection failed. Even if an unencumbered agent does what she wants, if she is determined, at least as the incompatibilist maintains, she could not have done otherwise. Since, as the objection goes, freedom of will requires freedom involving alternative possibilities, classical compatibilist freedom falls."
"A good deal more could be said in an effort to explain the sort of compatibilism Mele suggests, but one of the more provocative and distinctive element in his account is his strategic return to the austerity of the classical compatibilists."
Yet, he still doesn't deal with the problems that arise from having an omni-max deity.
"I've provided two, Compatibilism and Molinism, that every known philospher and theologian in the annals of mankind will acknowledge as potential solutions, even if they disagree with them."
They aren't solutions! That's the problem. They are basically people saying, "I don't agree, and I'm going to define my 'philosophy' such that it defeats your argument and I win." But, as we've seen and SmartLX has asked for, there aren't any defeaters actually on hand, there's only supposed ones and people saying they have them, but none to be found.
"The existence of these well-known solutions, with broad-based support over centuries makes it rational for me to be skeptical of your argument."
That's like saying that it's rational to believe in god simply because others have done so and attempted to make rational arguments for god, even if those arguments have failed.
"Any other conclusion is irrational, unless I missed the part where you demonstrated Compatibilism and Molinism to be false, to the amazement of every other thinker in the history of the world who has failed to do so."
That's the whole point of the original argument, that it shows that omni-max deities create a type of determinism that precludes free will. If you wish to argue that non-omni-max deities can create a universe that allows for free will, I don't know if that is true or not. I don't know if we have free will or not. What I do know is that logically we can not have free will if god is omni-max, because if god were to give us the book of our lives (which he has the power to create) then we will either be forced to follow it, or god would be shown to have erred in compiling the book.
I rest, and am satisfied
I rest, and am satisfied with the debate.
Thanks again, Smart. I agreed with my anonymous friend that this thread would remain anonymous before I approached you. I'll honor that promise, but I'll also find a way to get the word out independently of this thread that you're a class act.
Ta.
Much obliged, and again, glad to be of service. It's been a nice change to host a discussion from the peanut gallery.
When schooner and I butt
When schooner and I butt heads, that can happen.
Thanks for hosting.